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New risks inadequately managed: the case of smart
implants and medical device regulation
Shawn H.E. Harmona, Gill Haddowb and Leah Gilmanb
aSchool of Law, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, UK; bSchool of Social and Political Science,
University of Edinburgh, Scotland, UK
ABSTRACT
Many emerging technologies are associated with ‘risk’. While the concept of risk
is protean, it is usually conceived of as the potential of something damaging or
harmful happening. Thus, risks are a primary target of many regulatory regimes.
In this article, after articulating an understanding of risk, we assess the European
medical devices regulatory regime from a risk perspective, focusing on its
handling of ‘smart’ implantable medical devices. In doing so, we discuss the
empirical evidence obtained from expert participants in the Implantable
Smart Technologies Project, which evidence is framed around three risk
typologies: materiality, geography and modality. We conclude that none of
these risks are sufﬁciently addressed within the existing regime, which falls
down not just from a standards perspective, but also from the perspective of
transparency and balance.
KEYWORDS risk; emerging technologies; medical devices; European Union; Implantable Smart
Technologies Project
1. Introduction
All manner of risks to human well-being have been identiﬁed, including
injury, invasive pathogens, genetic inheritance and the acquired and
chronic diseases associated with aging, to name but a few. In an attempt to
isolate and avoid these risks, and mitigate their deleterious consequences,
we invent health technologies aimed at preventing, diagnosing and treating
a wide range of conditions. Many of these health technologies are medical
devices, a ﬁeld which employs over 500,000 people in about 25,000 companies
in Europe alone, and which generates annual sales of around €95 billion from
some 500,000 products.1
© 2015 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
CONTACT Shawn H.E. Harmon shawn.harmon@ed.ac.uk.
1European Commission, ‘Safe, effective and innovative medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical
devices for the beneﬁt of patients, consumers and healthcare professionals’ COM (2012) 540 Final
http://ec.europa.eu/health/medical-devices/ﬁles/revision_docs/com_2012_540_revision_en.pdf
(accessed 25 September 2014).
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The medical devices ﬁeld is characterised by rapid and accelerating inno-
vation, with drug development, tissue engineering, information and com-
munication technologies and nanoscience playing a role in its evolution. As
advances are made in materials, miniaturisation and energy generation,
medical devices are becoming smaller, faster, more powerful and increasingly
embedded or integrated into the body.2 Indeed, our lives are increasingly
enacted within an intricate web of increasingly ‘smart’ technologies, which
are not just performing for us, but also on us and within us. By ‘smart’, we
mean they exhibit one or more of computational intelligence, autonomous
operation and responsiveness to environmental changes (i.e. they monitor,
transmit, and potentially initiate a treatment action).3
Given the above, there are very real concerns about the extent to which
medical device regulations address the risks associated with these smart
implanted medical devices (IMDs). In this paper, after unpacking the concept
of risk, we discuss evidence generated in relation to risks, smart IMDs and the
ﬁtness of the European Union (EU) regulatory framework, which informs
United Kingdom (UK) approaches to device testing andmarket authorisation.4
In the EU, IMDsare regulated by theActive ImplantableMedicalDevicesDirec-
tive (AIMDD),5 the Medical Devices Directive (MDD)6 and the In Vitro Diag-
nostic Medical Devices Directive (IVDMDD).7 These have been amended by
EU Directive 2007/47/EC.8 (References to the EU framework are to the conso-
lidated version of the instruments.9) The UK implementing legislation is the
Medical Devices Regulations 2002, as amended.10
2By the late 1990s, the US Food and Drug Administration had approved some 500,000 medical device
models, and some 4% of the population has at least one implanted device: Lee Monsein, ‘Primer on
Medical Device Regulation’ (1997) 20 Radiology 1; William Maisel, ‘Medical Device Regulation: An Intro-
duction for the Practicing Physician’ (2004) 140 Annual Internal Medicine 296. The 2011 global market for
neuro devices alone has been estimated at US$8.63 billion: Neurol Insights, The Neurotechnology Industry
2012 Report (Neurol Insights, 2012) 18.
3For more on ‘smart’, see Gill Haddow, Shawn Harmon and Leah Gilman, ‘Implantable Smart Technologies:
Deﬁning the “Sting” in Data and Devices’ forthcoming Health Care Analysis. 2015
4And we draw on insights from the USA where applicable in recognition of the strong harmonising currents
that characterise this sector: ChristopherHodges, ‘EnsuringaHigh Level of BusinessConduct in the EU’ (2009)
17 Regulatory Affairs Journal Devices 13.
5Council Directive 90/385/EEC of 20 June 1990 on the approximation of the laws of theMember States relating to
active implantablemedical devices, [1990] 33OJ L189. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CONSLEG:1990L0385:20071011:EN:PDF.
6Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 on medical devices, [1993] 36 OJ L169. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1993L0042:20071011:en:PDF
7Council Directive 98/79/EC of 27 October 1998 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices, [1998] 41 OJ L331.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1998L0079:20090807:EN:PDF.
8Council Directive 2007/47/EC of 5 September 2007, [2007] 50 OJ L247. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:247:0021:0055:EN:PDF.
9See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1990L0385:20071011:EN:PDF.
References to the consolidated Directive are henceforth identiﬁed as ‘EU Directive’.
10Medical Devices Regulations 2002, SI 2002/618, amended by the Medical Devices (Amendment) Regu-
lations 2003, SI 2003/1697 (reclassifying breast implants and adding requirements covering devices
using materials from TSE-susceptible animal species), the Medical Devices (Amendment) Regulations
2007, SI 2007/400 (reclassifying total hip, knee and shoulder joints); the Medical Devices (Amendment)
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The paper will unfold as follows. First, we introduce the empirical inter-
disciplinary project that informs this paper, highlighting some of the exist-
ing and emerging IMDs that are captured by the idea of smart IMDs.
Second, we very brieﬂy outline the EU/UK devices regime, which formed
the backdrop against which our empirical evidence was taken. Third, we
consider the risks that our respondents perceived as being particularly rel-
evant to smart IMDs, although we emphasise that some of the concerns are
common to all IMDs, not just smart IMDs. Fourth, we brieﬂy discuss that
evidence, considering what it says about the existing framework from risk
and regulation perspectives. We conclude that smart IMDs have a number
of features that translate into risks for which the existing framework is ill-
equipped. Indeed, we argue that smart IMDs have features that challenge
regulatory frameworks beyond the devices regime, and we make some
modest suggestions for reform.
2. Risk and the implantable smart technologies project
Many emerging technologies, especially those that interact with the human
body, are associated with ‘risk’. While there is signiﬁcant sociological,
medical, legal and economic literature on risk, there is no commonly accepted
deﬁnition of risk, which has both descriptive and normative aspects.11 For
present purposes, risk is conceived of as the potential for some negative or
undesirable (i.e. destructive, damaging, harmful, unbalancing, undermining,
affronting) state of affairs arising, with the implication that some action is
warranted to avoid the risk, or to mitigate the consequences of it occurring,
or both.12 Of course, this simple deﬁnition belies great complexity, for there
is ample latitude for disagreement over:
. what counts as risk
. what should be acknowledged as proper variables in assessing/measuring
risk
. what constitutes an acceptable level of risk
. what actions are most appropriate or effective for avoiding or mitigating
risk.
The problems associated with risk are magniﬁed (and multiplied) when the
technologies that we devise to avoid, mitigate, or manage risk also contribute
Regulations 2008, SI 2008/2936 (Medical Devices Regulations 2002, transposing Directive 2007/47/EC
into UK law).
11Ortwin Renn, ‘Three Decades of Risk Research: Accomplishments and New Challenges’ (1998) 1 Journal
Risk Research 49, 50–51. Though this authority is dated, the proposition remains true.
12Royal Society, Risk Assessment (RS, 1983); Royal Society, Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management (RS,
1992).
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to the formation of new risks, which themselves might be individually or
socially experienced.13
The ‘Implantable Smart Technologies Project’ (ISTP),14 was an empirical
interdisciplinary project which had as one if its aims the exploration of ‘risk’
in relation to smart IMDs, a species of technology that might be viewed as
giving rise to new and novel risks. At the outset, and drawing on literatures
from the technical, social and legal disciplines, we conceived of risk as
having two essential components, both common regulatory targets, namely
‘safety’ and ‘efﬁcacy’. While safety is not an easy term to deﬁne, we take it to
encompass the physiological and psycho-social harms that might result from
receiving the IMD in question. Thus, safety measures are those actions
which ameliorate the risk posed by the intervention itself. Efﬁcacy, conversely,
engages with that harmwhich the intervention is intended to avoid ormitigate.
It highlights the fact that interventions are undertaken (and IMDs implanted)
to serve a clinical purpose, and the question is therefore whether the interven-
tion is delivering something effective; if the patient is not receiving what is
expected in response to the condition, there can be profound health and well-
being consequences (and so risks derived from non-efﬁcacy).
Armed with this conception of risk, we undertook several empirical
encounters to explore the term further (as well as the term ‘smart’). The
ﬁrst was a 2011 pilot workshop involving 13 experts from seven European jur-
isdictions and the USA undertaken by Harmon.15 The second was an inde-
pendent allied project called Recovering Cancer Patients Views on in-Vivo
Biosensors undertaken by Haddow.16 The third, undertaken more directly
under the auspices of the ISTP, comprised 11 qualitative interviews with Edin-
burgh-based stakeholders.17 Interview respondents for this encounter were
chosen for their involvement in the development, regulation, study or use
of implantable technologies, and they were initially identiﬁed through existing
networks of researchers, relevant university websites and local hospitals. The
sample was expanded using a ‘snowball’ approach.18 Ultimately, ﬁve were
professionals working at the legal/ethical interface of medical technologies,
three were medical practitioners and researchers, one was a clinical scientist,
13Ulrich Beck, The Risk Society (Sage, 1992); Anthony Giddens, ‘Risk and Responsibility’ (1999) 62 Modern
Law Review 1; D Lupton, Risk (Routledge, 1999); P Slovic, The Perception of Risk (Earthscan, 2001); C
Panter-Brick and A Fuentes (eds), Health, Risk and Adversity (Berghahn Books, 2009).
14See Mason Institute, Our Research.
15Shawn Harmon, ‘Phase I Report of the Implanted Smart Technologies Project’ (2011) 8:2 SCRIPTed 212.
16Gill Haddow, Emma King et al., ‘Cyborgs in the Everyday: Masculinity and Biosensing Prostate Cancer’
(2015) Science as Culture online doi:10.1080/09505431.2015.1063597.
17Throughout this encounter, we worked with an artist who helped shape the interviews and generated
interpretive visual outputs relevant to ﬁndings, which were publicly exhibited as ‘Healing Hands: From
Vitruvian Man to Machine Man’, Tent Gallery, Edinburgh, 17 April 2014.
18Clive Seale, ‘Validity, Reliability and the Quality of Research’ in Clive Seale (ed), Researching Society and
Culture (Sage, 2nd edn 2004) ch 30; Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (OUP, 2012).
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one an engineer, and one an implanted patient, and each are described in
Table 1.
All interviews were, with consent, recorded using a digital audio recorder
and then transcribed verbatim. The transcripts were read multiple times by all
members of the team, and analysis proceeded following a grounded theory
approach,19 which is arguably now the standard form of qualitative analysis.20
Importantly, the ISTP was not concerned with scaffolding technologies
such as hips, knees or other prosthetics. Rather, our investigations centred
on more active or ‘smart’ implantable technologies: cochlear implants (CIs);
implantable cardiac deﬁbrillators (ICDs); in vivo biosensors (IVBSs) and
deep brain stimulators (DBSs). These particular devices were chosen as the
objects of the empirical element because: (1) they implicate very different
physiological objectives and technical solutions all within the unifying ﬁeld
of IMDs; (2) they are either clinically available or close to clinical testing;
(3) they have what we preliminarily considered to be ‘smart’ characteristics
(i.e. they actively interacted, monitored and/or transmitted) and (4) they
were familiar to our participant sample.
As can be gleaned from the more fulsome descriptions in Table 2, the
subject IMDs are aimed at the diagnosis, monitoring or treatment of a
disease or condition, and none of them operate by pharmacological, immuno-
logical or metabolic means. They rely on a power source not derivative of the
body or gravity, and they are surgically or medically introduced into the body,
and remain in the body post-procedure. As such, they are subject to the
medical devices regime, which deﬁnes a ‘medical device’ as:21
any instrument, apparatus, appliance, software, material or other article,
whether used alone or in combination, together with any accessories, including
the software intended by its manufacturer to be used speciﬁcally for diagnostic
Table 1. ISTP Respondents
Reference Respondent’s Description
R1-Lawyer-1 Experience assessing emerging technologies and policies
R2-Engineer Experience innovating in the IMD ﬁeld
R3-Clinician-1 Specialist in clinical oncology
R4-Clinical Scientist Clinical physicist specialising in cochlear implants
R5-Lawyer-2 Experience assessing emerging technologies
R6-Clinician-2 Academic Cardiologist
R7-Clinician-3 Specialist in heart rhythm disorders
R8-Bioethicist Served on research ethics and teaches medical ethics
R9-Policymaker Civil servant and member of the MHRA
R10-Government Researcher Senior civil servant with expertise in devices legislation
R11-Patient Living with an Implantable Cardiac Deﬁbrillator
19Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing
Grounded Theory (Sage, 1998).
20Gary Thomas and David James, ‘Reinventing Grounded Theory: Some Questions about Theory, Ground
and Discovery’ (2006) 32 British Education Research Journal 767.
21Article 2.1(a), EU Directive.
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and/or therapeutic purposes and necessary for its proper application, intended
by the manufacturer to be used for human beings for the purpose of:
. diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment or alleviation of disease,
. diagnosis, monitoring, treatment, alleviation of or compensation for an
injury or handicap,
. investigation, replacement or modiﬁcation of the anatomy or of a physio-
logical process,
. control of conception, and which does not achieve its principal intended
action in or on the human body by pharmacological, immunological or
metabolic means, but which may be assisted in its function by such means.
An ‘active medical device’ is a device reliant on a source of electrical or other
source of power other than that generated by the human body or gravity.22 An
Table 2. The Subject Implanted Devices
Device Physical Description Physiological Function
CI Cochlear Implants are composed of an external
component (a microphone, speech processor,
and transmitter), which sits behind the ear, and
an internal component (an electrode array),
which is surgically placed within the ear.
Cochlear Implants can provide a sense of
sound to those who are profoundly deaf or
extremely hard-of-hearing. They do not
restore ‘normal hearing’, but rather replace it
by interacting with the environment and the
auditory nerve to generate a physiological
reaction.*
ICD Implanted Cardiac Deﬁbrillators are ﬂat, metal
devices containing programmable electronics
and a battery. Though surgically implanted in
the chest, they have leads that run to the heart.
Implanted Cardiac Deﬁbrillators deliver
electrical shocks to the heart when they sense
the onset of life-threatening arrhythmias.
IVBS In Vivo Biosensors are metal sensors, often
coated in gold, that are extremely small, almost
pinhead-sized, and contain an electrical power
source.
In Vivo Biosensors measure a tumour’s
biological environment, assessing whether
real-time ﬂuctuations in oxygen, Ph levels,
etc., can be exploited to optimise the timing
of treatment thereby overcoming
radiotherapy resistance (i.e., treatment can be
scheduled for when the tumour is least
resistant).
DBS Deep Brain Stimulators comprise a pulse
generator implanted in the chest (near the
collarbone), and subcutaneous leads running
to electrodes implanted in the brain.**
Deep Brain Stimulators are intended to
alleviate tremor, stiffness, and slowness
caused by Parkinson’s. They are patient-
controlled and there is some evidence that
they may improve lung function, memory,
and mood disorders such as depression.***
Notes: * For more on the development of this technology, see Raghu Garud and Michael Rappa, ‘A Socio-
Cognitive Model of Technology Evolution: The Case of Cochlear Implants’ (1994) 5 Organisation Science
344.
**See <www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/265445.php> (accessed 26 February 2014).
***Michael Okun, Hubert Fernandez, Ramon Rodriguez and Kelly Foote, ‘Identifying Candidates for Deep
Brain Stimulation in Parkinson’s Disease: The Role of the Primary Care Physician’ (2007) 62 Geriatrics 18;
Walter Glannon, ‘Consent to Deep Brain Stimulation for Neurological and Psychiatric Disorders’ (2010) 21
Journal Clinical Ethics 104; Jonathan Hyam, ‘Controlling the Lungs Via the Brain: A Novel Neurosurgical
Method to Improve Lung Function in Humans’ (2012) 70 Neurosurgery 469.
22Article 1.2(b), EU Directive.
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‘active implantable medical device’ is an active medical device intended to be
totally or partially introduced, surgically or medically, into the human body or
natural oriﬁce, and which is intended to remain after the procedure.23 (The
new European regime would also capture these devices, as well as certain cos-
metic devices, adopting harmonised deﬁnitions).24
Having outlined the project, and demonstrated that smart IMDs are caught
by the regulatory framework, it is useful to offer a very brief overview of that
framework before turning to the evidence on risks that was generated by our
qualitative encounters.
3. Snapshot of the regulatory landscape
At the outset, we acknowledge that the EU is considering new legislation in
this area,25 but the fact remains that the consolidated instruments identiﬁed
above continue to operate, and will do so for the foreseeable future. Very gen-
erally, under the EU regime, regulatory functions are performed by national
competent authorities.26 The UK’s national competent authority is the Medi-
cines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), which is tasked
with ensuring compliance with standards, taking steps to prohibit or with-
draw devices that do not meet standards, and recording, evaluating and
reporting incidents.27 In practice, the MHRA approves, monitors, audits,
and inspects ‘notiﬁed bodies’. There are six such bodies in the UK, and 76
across the EU.28
The notiﬁed bodies maintain a register of manufacturers, assess notiﬁca-
tions of clinical investigations, enforce compliance of ‘CE’ marked devices
(devices must generally bear the ‘CE’marking, which signiﬁes that it complies
with quality standards),29 authorise the use of non-CE marked devices and
undertake surveillance.30 In assessing a device, several factors are considered:
23Article 1.2(c), EU Directive.
24European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
medical devices, and amending Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002, and Regulation
(EC) No. 1223/2009, COM (2012) 542 ﬁnal, 4–5, and Article 2.1 of the appended Regulation, which
deﬁnes ‘medical device’, ‘active device’, ‘implantable device’ and ‘invasive device’ http://ec.europa.
eu/health/medical-devices/ﬁles/revision_docs/proposal_2012_542_en.pdf (accessed 11 August 2014).
25The two core instruments proposed are the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on medical devices, and amending Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) 178/2002 and
Regulation (EC) 1223/2009, and the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on in vitro diagnostic medical devices http://ec.europa.eu/health/medical-devices/documents/
revision/index_en.htm (accessed 11 August 2014).
26EU Directive, Annex 8.
27EU Directive, arts 7, 8, 9, and Annex 8.
28See Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, How We Regulate www.mhra.gov.uk/
Howweregulate/Devices/NotiﬁedBodies/index.htm.
29 EU Directive, art 12 and Annexes 2 to 5.
30See Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, How We Regulate www.mhra.gov.uk/
Howweregulate/Devices/NotiﬁedBodies/index.htm; also DOH, Poly Implant Prothèse (PIP) Silicone
Breast Implants: Review of the Actions of the MHRA and DOH (2012) www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/216537/dh_134043.pdf.
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. the purpose and mode of action of the device;
. how long the device is intended to be in continuous use;
. whether the device is implanted, invasive or active;
. whether the device contains a medicinal substance that acts ancillary to the
device.31
Based on these factors, devices are assigned to one of the following
classiﬁcations:32
. Class I (non-invasive and low risk such as tables and wheelchairs);
. Class IIa (active and medium risk such as endoscopes and ultrasounds);
. Class IIb (active and used in critical conditions but still medium risk);
. Class III (invasive and high risk such as joints, stents, and ICDs).
The classiﬁcation of a device determines the standards applicable for issuance
of a CE mark, and the level of regulator involvement (and a device’s classiﬁ-
cation can change over time, shifting, for example, from Class II to Class III).33
4. Perceived risks of the subject in relation to IMDs
In this section, we explore the risks that the ISTP respondents considered to
be of concern in relation to smart IMDs. They can be organised around three
conceptual phenomena: ‘materiality’; ‘geography’ and ‘modality’.
4.1 Materiality
Materiality relates to the tangible physical material that is used to construct
the IMD and its components. Given that all IMDs will invariably have
some material element that will be of a different substance or nature to that
of the receiving body, they will naturally pose some risk of physiological reac-
tion in the recipient (and in this respect, smart IMDs are not particularly
unique). R2-Engineer, reported:
[W]e know that the risks in [IMDs] are toxicity, potential radiation, and then
rejection by the body, and possibly inﬂammation. These are the three known
problem areas… If you had to make [an IVBS] out of aluminium, which the
body really doesn’t like, then you’d have to think of some way of protecting
the body from the aluminium by covering it up, sealing it off.
31See Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, How We Regulate www.mhra.gov.uk/
Howweregulate/Devices/Classiﬁcation/index.htm.
32EU Directive, art 9 and Annex 9.
33These classiﬁcations have been retained in the proposed amended regime, but with the relevant
Annexes revised to reﬂect technical progress and learning from existing surveillance activities: European
Commission, COM (2012) 542 ﬁnal (n 24), pp. 8–9.
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R3-Clinician-1 conﬁrmed that some materials have good track records; gold
and titanium, for example, are known to be inert in the body.
However, and arguably, risks associated with inﬂammatory or immunological
responses to a device’s materiality might be accentuated in the case of smart
IMDs because, as they become more sophisticated and perform more (and
more complex) functions, they will become both smaller (and potentially
more fragile) and more invasive (i.e. more deeply embedded and in parts of
the body considered more integral or central to higher functioning and identity).
R7-Clinician-3 recounted the problems that arose in relation to ICDs, which rely
on narrow leads operating in a ‘hostile’ environment (i.e. the heart, which is con-
stantly moving). Efforts to streamline ICDs resulted in the implantation of
devices with leads that were too thin. Respondent-7-Clinican 3 went on to say:
[Companies] try and get a commercial edge by making features on their device
…which make them attractive to us and to patients. So they’re trying to devise
leads which are slimmer and easier to implant, and they devised this ﬁdelis lead
which was quite a small diameter lead, but it just wasn’t robust enough… I
think it’s now accepted… that the leads are as small as they’re safely going
to get…
In addition to reducing the performance of the IMD, which leaves the patient
vulnerable to their disease/condition, chronic responses to IMD materiality
can lead to full foreign-body reactions that ‘wall-off’ the device. This
process, known as ‘bio-fouling’, can generate its own symptoms quite apart
from the original condition that necessitated the device.34
The existing regulations stipulate that devices must be designed and manu-
factured in such a way as to remove or minimize as far as possible the risk of
physical injury in connection with their physical or dimensional features,35
and that, during the manufacture of devices, particular attention must be
paid to: 36
. the choice of materials used, particularly as regards toxicity aspects;
. mutual compatibility between thematerials used and biological tissues, cells
and body ﬂuids, account being taken of the anticipated use of the device;
. compatibility of the devices with the substances they are intended to
administer;
. the quality of the connections, particularly in respect of safety;
. the reliability of the source of energy;
34See Yoshinori Onuki, Upkar Bhardwaj, Fotios Papadimitrakopoulos et al, ‘A Review of the Biocompatibil-
ity of Implantable Devices: Current Challenges to Overcome Foreign Body Response’ (2008) 2 Journal
Diabetes Science & Technology 1003; Jacqueline Morais, Fotios Papadimitrakopoulos and Diane
Burgess, ‘Biomaterials/tissue Interactions: Possible Solutions to Overcome Foreign Body Response’
(2010) 12 The AAPS Journal 188.
35EU Directive, para 8, Annex I.
36EU Directive, para 9, Annex I.
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. if appropriate, that they are leak-proof…
In short, both the responsibility for setting the risk tolerances and for mana-
ging the risks associated with materiality are placed on the device manufac-
turers. While this may be both practical and sensible, and while there is
signiﬁcant knowledge associated with materiality in the industry, our respon-
dents expressed concerns about how this risk was approached under the exist-
ing regime. R9-Policymaker cautioned that bespoke clinical investigations
around materiality (as well as other elements and functions of IMDs, both
smart and non-smart) are often not undertaken. In fact, the ICD leads men-
tioned by R7-Clinician-3 were licensed and administered in the absence of
human clinical data.37 Manufacturer duties were reiterated by R10-
Government Researcher, who stated that ongoing monitoring of this risk
was largely absent.38
Concerns around materiality become more critical when IMDs have a bio-
logical component. Work is underway to coat IMDs with polymers, medicines
and sometimes tissue. It was agreed by our respondents that both biologics
and nanomaterials introduce new levels of complexity and uncertainty
because they naturally react and interact with the host’s body. However, the
evidence base for how these materials interact is poor, and there is little regu-
latory assurance that good evidence will be generated.
A holistic view of our respondents’ evidence suggests that, for the subject
smart IMDs and similarly complex emerging devices, the regulatory regime is
insufﬁciently speciﬁc in the type and quality of evidence that would be
required before a device is accepted for a speciﬁc classiﬁcation and awarded
a CE mark. This regulatory uncertainty, when combined with the scientiﬁc
uncertainty often associated with new smart IMDs and some of the exper-
imental materials, is undesirable, and potentially very harmful, and the
matter will become more pressing as novel materials become more prevalent.
4.2 Geography
The second risk-related phenomenon, ‘geography’, refers to the location of the
IMD within the body. This raises issues of invasiveness and identity. On the
former, most smart IMDs require a surgical intervention whereby the device
or a part thereof is implanted (although as they become smaller some can be
injected). Sometimes, elements of the device (such as ICD and DBS leads) are
run from one location within the body to another, sometimes through the
veins. Obviously, the implantation process bears risks common to all
37William Maisel, ‘Semper Fidelis: Consumer Protection for Patients with Implanted Medical Devices’
(2008) 358 New England Journal Medicine 985.
38As an example of how manufacturers are left to their own devices with respect to assessing and mana-
ging materiality, R10 referred to the non-smart IMD example of PIP breast implants.
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surgeries, and this is addressed by other medical regulation. However, our
respondents expressed the most concern in relation to IMDs implanted in
the brain. It is already known, for example, that brain-implanted smart
IMDs, in addition to prompting intense responses by patients and others,
can impact on recipient identity and well-being (and there is signiﬁcant litera-
ture on DBS affecting personality).39 On this issue, R2-Engineer stated:
I think I’d be, in principle, more concerned with something that was going
inside my head than something going inside any other bit of me. Once you
get south of the border, if the neck’s the border, I guess I would be pretty
level about everything. There may be occasional bits and pieces that I might
think about, but if it’s the body and not the thinking bit, I would say that’s
one thing; if it’s the thinking bit, I would say that’s a different thing.
R5-Lawyer 2 concurred, stating:
There must be a sliding scale. If it’s just under your skin and in a kind of non-
fetishized part of your body, a very boring bit of your body, then it’s nothing, it’s
almost external. But when the organ in question becomes more about who you
are and more, ‘woohoo’, it becomes spookier. I think that’s probably a spectrum
from the wearable to the really banal implanted to the really special secret
places where normally you would not go poking around.
R8-Bioethicist concurred, acknowledging that our understanding of the brain is
so limited and so recent that IMDs associated with it raise special and widely
agreed concerns about personality change, damage to thinking centres, external
monitoring (i.e, brain-wave monitoring), and free will (i.e. ‘mind reading’ or
control). In short, as explained by R1-Lawyer-1, perceptions of risk change dra-
matically once the IMD goes into the brain, for implantations in that organ are
viewed as more invasive and more threatening to our capacities and identity.40
The regulation’s materiality provisions noted above would apply here, as well
as more general provisions which state that the device’s use must not compro-
mise the clinical condition or safety of the patient,41 and any side effects or
undesirable conditions arising from the device must constitute ‘acceptable
risks’ when weighed against the performances intended.42 Of course, the
issue of what constitutes an acceptable risk remains undeﬁned and reliant on
manufacturer sensibilities, and the lack of understanding of certain organs
39Robin Mackenzie, ‘Who Should Hold the Remote for the New Me? Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral
Side Effects of DBS and Authentic Choices over Future Personalities’ (2011) 2 American Journal of
Bioethics Neuroscience 18; Michelle Cortez, ‘Electrical Deep-Brain Stimulation Enhances Memory in
Small Study’, Businessweek (9 February 2012) www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-08/
stimulating-brain-with-electric-current-enhances-memory-research-shows; Alok Jah, ‘When We Turn
The Current On, The Patients Report The Emptiness Suddenly Disappears, The Guardian (London, 31
March 2006) www.guardian.co.uk/science/2006/mar/31/medicalresearch.neuroscience.
40This special status was also acknowledged in Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics, Novel Neurotechnologies:
Intervening in the Brain (London: NCB, 2013) 6, 73–4.
41EU Directive, Annex I, paras 1, 3.
42EU Directive, Annex I, para 5.
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and biological processes will continue to complicate smart IMD development
aimed at certain interventions, leaving regulators with little independent knowl-
edge on which to base decisions; it is themanufacturer, in cooperation with the
notiﬁed body, which provides the evidence on which regulatory decisions are
made, and which determines the classiﬁcation. The national competent auth-
ority (the MHRA) only audits the process. However, different notiﬁed bodies
have different standards, expectations for evidence and levels of competence,
and manufacturers can choose which one to work with.43 Thus, manufacturers
can choose notiﬁed bodies that are less demanding (i.e. that require the expen-
diture of less effort tomeet regulatory standards). The result has been that many
devices make it to market without rigorous supporting evidence (and certainly
with less evidence than is expected of drugs).44
And there have been some very public failures in the context of non-smart
IMDs. For example, in addition to the breast implants and metal-on-metal hip
failures, it has been reported that a distal protection system for coronary
artery interventions received an EU CE mark after a single study involving
22 subjects showed that it worked as intended, whereas approval was only
granted in the US several years later after a randomised study involving 800
subjects.45 Indeed, many devices are granted the CE mark on the basis of lit-
erature alone so long as the manufacturer can demonstrate that the device is
equivalent to one already on the market.46 The utility of this assessment is
undermined when a device is approved based on a predicate device that
was itself approved based on a predicate device.47
4.3 Modality
The third and ﬁnal risk phenomenon that concerned our respondents relates
to ‘modality’. This concept refers to the IMD’s method of action and
43Deborah Cohen and Matthew Billingsley, ‘Europeans are Left to their Own Devices’ (2011) 342 British
Medical Journal 1, 2.
44Bruce Campbell, ‘Report on Registers – For the MHRA’ (2010) http://www.mhra.gov.uk/home/groups/clin/
documents/websiteresources/con082076.pdf.
45Daniel Kramer et al, ‘Security and Privacy Qualities for Medical Devices: An Analysis of FDA Postmarket
Surveillance’ (2012) 7 PLoS One 1. Having said that, the evidence-base for US approvals has come under
similar criticism: M Feldman et al, ‘Who is Responsible for Evaluating the Safety and Effectiveness of
Medical Devices? The Role of Independent Technology Assessment’ (2007) 23 Journal General Internal
Medicine (Supp 1) 57.
46See EU Directive Annex 7. The equivalent US system is the so-called 510(k) premarket notiﬁcation
process, which, again, is grounded on the assumption that the device is equivalent to ones already
approved, and so lesser data is needed to meet the safety and performance evidentiary requirements,
with almost nothing on clinical beneﬁt: Daniel Feigal, ‘Ensuring Safe and Effective Medical Devices’
(2003) 348 New England Journal of Medicine 191; S Runner, ‘FDA Marketing Claims and the Practitioner’
(2006) 6 Journal Evidence Based Dental Practice 19.
47Under the proposed regime, clear quality management systems are demanded of all manufacturers,
stricter quality management responsibilities are expected for high risk devices, compliance to regulatory
standards is assured by a ‘qualiﬁed person’ at the manufacturer, and there are amended requirements
for the supporting technical documentation and declaration of conformity: European Commission, Pro-
posal COM(2012) 542 ﬁnal, at 5–6.
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functionality, and it has several elements – physiological responses, psycho-
social responses, and third party access – each of which are addressed below.
4.3.1 Physiological responses to smart IMDs
With respect to the physiological, it was felt that, as IMDs become more
complex, they will interact in novel and unanticipated ways with the body,
and have increased potential to malfunction, which could have profound con-
sequences for recipients. R2-Engineer wondered about the repercussions of
‘misﬁring’ treatments once IMDs are medicinally coated, or once drugs are
put on chips for timed release or release in real-time response to physiological
developments (both of which are innovation targets). The implications of
concentrated doses of chemotherapy being released improperly into the
body, for example, could be immense.
This is an issue of regulatory operation insofar as the framework already
addresses the concerns voiced. Existing provisions, for example, state that
devices must be designed and manufactured in such a way as to guarantee
their safety characteristics and performances, with particular attention
being paid to the proper functioning of the programming and control
systems, taking into account the principles of development lifecycle, risk man-
agement, validation and veriﬁcation.48 Other provisions state that, where
devices incorporate a substance which, if used separately, may be considered
a medicinal product, and which is liable to act upon the body with action
ancillary to that of the device, the quality, safety and usefulness of the sub-
stance must be veriﬁed.49
The big question that remains, however, is whether the existing system is
vigilant enough. It is generally considered not to be, with notiﬁed bodies – pri-
vately run bodies who are not public health agencies – seeing themselves as
‘clients’ of the manufacturers. They do not publish their decision-making
process, nor the evidence provided by the manufacturer on which they base
their decision, and they often keep information relating to safety conﬁdential.50
4.3.2 Psycho-social responses to smart IMDs
On the psycho-social element of modality, R5-Lawyer-2 emphasised that,
while modality can have physical implications, it can also have strong
48Paragraph 9, Annex I, EU Directive.
49Paragraph 10, Annex I, EU Directive.
50Cohen and Billingsley (n 46); Kramer et al (n 48); Christa Altenstetter, ‘Medical Device Regulation and
Nanotechnologies: Determining the Role of Patient Safety Concerns in Policymaking’ (2011) 33 Law &
Policy 227; Alan Fraser et al, ‘Clinical Evaluation of Cardiovascular Devices: Principles, Problems and Pro-
posals for European Regulatory Reform’ (2011) 32 European Heart Journal 1673, 1684. And this secrecy
appears to be supported by regulatory provisions: see EU Directive arts 7, 8, 9 and Annex 8. The per-
formance of the FDA has also been declining, a fact attributed to growing reliance on industry user
fees, limited authority and resources to conduct proper post-market surveillance, and not enough
effort expended on understanding the relative advantages between interventions: Feldman et al (n 48).
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psychological/emotional implications, particularly if the IMD interacts with
(or indeed controls the operation of) an organ considered central to individual
well-being. DBSs, for example, have elicited diverse and highly emotive
responses. In particular, they have been known to cause signiﬁcant personality
change, such as hyper-mania, hyper-sexualisation and disinhibition.51 CIs can
have profound life and socialisation implications,52 and have been the subject
of heated debates around their perceived marginalisation of deaf culture and
deaf identity,53 and the propriety of implanting them in children has been
challenged.54
Despite smart IMD innovations almost invariably having psycho-social
implications, the regulatory regime is silent on this issue. The difﬁculty, high-
lighted by R1-Lawyer-1, is that these symptoms and impacts will be largely
unknown (possibly even un-theorised) until they present in users. The
result is that this risk is characterised by a high degree of uncertainty. As
such, robust post-market surveillance and coordination (i.e. effective monitor-
ing in the clinical context) is critical, but our respondents unanimously
thought that this was inadequate in the existing framework, from both a stan-
dards and practices perspective. In the UK, the following has been claimed:
The number of different types of devices on the market is about 80,000 in the
UK and over 200,000 in Europe. Uncertainty surrounds the numbers because
there is no publicly available list of devices being used… The MHRA does
not know precisely which Class III devices (the most risky) have been
cleared for use in the UK or Europe.… [T]he knowledge problem is com-
pounded by the fact that NHS procedures are poorly coded… So while we
can get detailed information about which drugs are being used in the NHS,
the same does not apply to devices.55
Similar observations have been made elsewhere:
[A] researcher or regulator can readily identify all the drugs the person was
taking before [a] procedure, but a detailed deﬁnition of the device itself is
not routinely recorded in most clinical databases. Therefore, when the modiﬁed
51Laura Klaming and Pim Haselager, ‘Did My Brain Implant Make Me Do It? Questions Raised by DBS
Regarding Psychological Continuity, Responsibility for Action and Mental Competence’ (2013) 6 Neu-
roethics 527.
52For a history of CIs, see Stuart Blume, ‘Histories of Cochlear Implantation’ (1999) 49 Social Science & Medi-
cine 1257.
53Bonnie Tucker, ‘Deaf Culture, Cochlear Implants and Elective Disability’ (1998) 28 Hastings Centre Report
6; R Sparrow, ‘Defending Deaf Culture: The Case of Cochlear Implants’ (2005) 13 Journal of Political Phil-
osophy 135.
54They have been implanted in children as young as six months old, the reason being that outcomes
improve the earlier the implantation: Linda Watson and Susan Gregory, ‘Non-use of Cochlear Implants
in Children: Child and Parent Perspectives’ (2005) 7 Deafness & Education International 43; Joseph
Valente, ‘Cyborgization: Deaf Education for Young Children in the Cochlear Implantation Era’ (2011)
17 Qualitative Inquiry 639; Augusto Peñaranda, Roberto Suarez, Natalia Niño et al, ‘Parents’ Narratives
on Cochlear Implantation: Reconstructing the Experience of Having a Child with Cochlear Implant’
(2011) 12 Cochlear Implants International 147.
55Cohen and Billingsley (n 46) 1–2.
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wiring of a pacemaker is found to cause potential fatal short circuits… it is hard
to perform a systematic assessment, notiﬁcation, or recall. Even car manufac-
turers have better databases to identify who uses their products… 56
Moreover, the surveillance system is complaint-triggered rather than systema-
tic, which means the data held by regulators is incomplete.57 Complaints are
usually instigated by competitors, whistle-blowers within device manufac-
turers or subjects in clinical trials, as opposed to patients or their physicians.58
Manufacturers rarely actively collect post-market data,59 and they do not
always publish recall data, nor identify which notiﬁed body issued the CE
mark, or at what classiﬁcation.60 More worrying is that, when manufacturers
do issue safety notices (and the number of safety notices issued have increased
dramatically, which is alarming in itself and reﬂects poorly on premarket
assessments), regulators do not always respond with medical device alerts
to the public.61
4.3.3 Third party access to smart IMDs
The ﬁnal aspect of modality relates to the inclusiveness of the ‘circle of
control’,62 and this, more than any other issue, is unique to smart IMDs,
and worried our respondents. This idea refers to the group of individuals
who are implicated in the IMD’s ongoing operation. New and emerging
smart IMDs are increasingly autonomous and reactive, often transmitting
data to third parties for interpretation and subsequent action, either by that
third party or by a clinician on advice from the third party. Given these func-
tions, our respondents expressed concerns around decision-making (i.e. by
designers and programmers) about how autonomous the devices will be
56Jerry Avorn, ‘Regulation of Devices: Lessons Can be Learnt from Drug Regulation’ (2010) 341 British
Medical Journal 947, 947. This concern is diminished under the proposed reforms which introduce
requirements for unique device identiﬁers, and manufacturers and importers to register themselves
and their devices on a central European register: European Commission COM (2012) 542 ﬁnal (n 24),
p. 7.
57It has been claimed that the proportion of device failures that are registered is less than 0.5%: Frederic
Resnic and Susan Normand, ‘Postmarketing Surveillance of Medical Devices: Filling in the Gaps’ (2012)
366 New England Journal Medicine 875.
58US Department of Health, Ensuring the Safety of Marketed Medical Devices: CDRH’s Medical Device Post-
market Safety Program (FDA, 2006).
59Amanda Maxwell, ‘EU Seriously Failing Post-Market Surveillance, Says UK Regulator’ (2010), Clinica www.
Clinica.co.uk/policyregulation/vigilance/EU-seriously-failing-post-market-surveillance-says-UK-regulator-
289356.
60C Heneghan et al, ‘Medical-Device Recalls in the UK and Device Regulation Process: Retrospective Review
of Safety Notices and Alerts’ (2011) 1 British Medical Journal Open 1.
61ibid. This reﬂects ﬁndings in other contexts that have found that critical commentaries on interventions
are often marginalised: Carine Vassy, ‘From a Genetic Innovation to Mass Health Programmes: The Diffu-
sion of Down’s Syndrome Prenatal Screening and Diagnostic Techniques in France’ (2006) 63 Social
Science & Medicine 2041; Anne Kerr et al, ‘Shifting Subject Positions: Experts and Lay People in Public
Dialogue’ (2007) 37 Social Studies of Science 385; Elsa Gisquet, ‘Cerebral Implants and Parkinson’s
Disease: A Unique Form of Biographical Disruption?’ (2008) 67 Social Science & Medicine 1847.
62See Haddow, Harmon and Gilman (n 3) for more on this idea of ‘circle of control’.
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and how secure they can be made. Linked to this is the issue of monitoring
and adjusting how the devices operate within the body.
With ICDs, for example, the clinician is directly involved in programming
the settings and sensitivities to physiological changes. For safety reasons, that
programming is performed in hospital. R7-Clinician-3 reported:
The worry about having programmability remotely is that, if that programming
goes wrong, you may not have a way to rescue the situation. So if you inadver-
tently programme something that is harmful to the patient, which occasionally
happens because these are incredibly sophisticated devices, it’s not a good idea
to have the person alone at home when that happens.
Several respondents expressed caution about expanding the circle of control
beyond the treatment team, and they were reluctant to include patients them-
selves. R7-Clinician-3 explained:
[S]ome patients ask us to make alterations to their pacemaker which are clearly
inappropriate. My worry is this balance between giving patients autonomy
versus patient safety. Our job is to advise and facilitate treatments for patient
safely, and in some ways you’d be passing a big part of the medical prac-
titioner’s role over to the patient. I would question whether, with some patients
at least… you [should] give your patient the power to make signiﬁcant changes
to the parameters of their pacemaker when that person isn’t medically trained
and maybe doesn’t fully understand the effects on physiology of making certain
adjustments …
Some IMDs have transmitters which will inform the hospital that they are
active (e.g. ICDs can notify the hospital when they ‘go off’). This expands the
circle of individuals who have knowledge about what the device is doing and
when. Obviously, this has implications for patient privacy, which is eroded as
more people become involved in treatment and device maintenance.
A more threatening aspect of privacy erosion that exercised our respondents
was the risk that persons outwith the treatment team – and so bearing no duty
of care to the patient –might hack into the device and gain knowledge, or, more
alarmingly, alter its parameters. R7-Clinician-3 stated that, although ICDs can
be interrogated online, they do not typically upload instructions remotely,
largely because of these security concerns. Despite different levels of concern
over hacking, R1-Lawyer-1 summed up many respondents’ fears:
[W]hat I would be interested in is the extent to which [the device] could be, or
is, controlled remotely, for example. Or its ability to self-regulate, and in what
ways, and if it is self-regulating, then what other controls could be exercised
over it if it became inappropriate or unsafe.
Modality, and this element in particular, was the most concerning in part
because our respondents viewed it as the least satisfactorily addressed by
the regulatory framework. In particular, data transmission and performance
modiﬁcation grounded in the operation of software (i.e. security and
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decryption) is little addressed in the regulation.63 It has been reported that
between 1999 and 2005 the number of recalls of software-bearing devices
rose by more than 100%, and over 11% of the recalls related to software fail-
ures.64 Risks have resulted in harms from poor user interfaces, poor systems
engineering and poorly articulated standards for safety, effectiveness, usabil-
ity, dependability, security, none of which are adequately addressed in the
existing regulatory regime.65 Additionally, the possibility of hacking into
IMDs has already been demonstrated,66 and concerns have been expressed
about the possibility of ‘remote homicide’ through device disruption.67
Some of the points of access to smart IMD software include device identi-
ﬁcation, data retrieval, device reconﬁguration and software upgrading, multi-
device coordination and communication, and manufacture audits in the event
of failures, each of which could serve as a point of vulnerability.68 These com-
bined with the reality of tens of millions of patients worldwide relying on soft-
ware-driven devices for life-critical functions (and our respondents
acknowledged that patient numbers will rise), means that the scope of this
risk is immense, and the need for solutions to device security is pressing.
Responses to issues such as software failure, data-ﬂooding and necessity of
upgrades must be both technology and regulation-based, but standards
remain poorly speciﬁed, with no guidance being given to assessors (such as
notiﬁed bodies) on appropriate and effective methods for evaluating how soft-
ware performs its functions within devices and whether they are adequately
secure,69 though such assessments are arguably mandated by the regulatory
framework.70
Ultimately, while the list of device (and patient) vulnerabilities stemming
from increased connectivity is growing, discourses about the appropriate
balance between security, utility and traceability are underdeveloped.71 At
base, it has been recommended that regulators should focus on outcomes
63Nothing signiﬁcant beyond EU Directive, Annex 1, para 9.
64Zhivko Bliznakov et al, ‘Analysis and Classiﬁcation of Medical Device Recalls’ (2006) 14 IFMBE Proceedings
3782.
65K Fu, ‘Trustworthy Medical Device Software’ (2011) www.cs.ucsb.edu/~sherwood/cs290/papers/fu.pdf.
66J Radcliffe, ‘Hacking Medical Devices for Fun and Insulin: Breaking the Human SCADA System’ (2011)
www.blackhat.com/html/bh-us-11/bh-us-11-brieﬁngs.html (accessed 20 March 2014); David Halperin
et al, ‘Pacemakers and Implantable Cardioverter-Deﬁbrillator: Software Radio Attacks and Zero Power
Defences’ in B Werner (ed), 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Institute of Electrical and Elec-
tronics Engineers, 2008) 129.
67Micheal Friedewald and David Wright (eds), Report: Policy Options to Counteract Threats and Vulnerabil-
ities in Ambient Intelligence (SWAMI Consortium, 2006).
68Kramer et al (n 48).
69K Fu, ‘Reducing Risks of Implantable Medical Devices’ (2009) 52 Communications ACM 25; W Maisel et al,
‘Improving the Security and Privacy of Implantable Medical Devices’ (2010) 362 New England Journal of
Medicine 1164; F McCaffery et al, ‘Medical Device Software Traceability’ in J Cleland-Huang et al (eds),
Software and Systems Traceability (Springer, 2012), 321–339.
70EU Directive, art 8.
71David Halperin et al, ‘Security and Privacy for Implantable Medical Devices’ (2008) January–March Per-
vasive Computing 30; Nathanael Paul, ‘A Review of the Security of Insulin Pump Infusion Systems’ (2011)
5 Journal of Diabetes Science & Technology 1557; and more.
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rather than on standards, which will not prove durable or translatable across
technologies (i.e. regulators should demand evidence of meaningful func-
tional and clinical goals, and how they are met by the device).72 The impor-
tance of the software dimension to IMD regulation cannot be overstated, not
only because of the potentially fatal physiological risks, but also the potentially
profound psycho-social impacts on patients, who already may have anxiety
around the IMD’s role in their body, fear about improper operation and
stress relating to a desire to exercise more personal control over the device.
5. Discussion of the empirical evidence
Our empirical evidence relates to understandings of both the risks associated
with IMDs generally, and smart IMDs more speciﬁcally, and the regulation
that applies to them. The overall view of our respondents was that each of
the above phenomena impact on ‘safety’ and ‘efﬁcacy’, both of which ought
to be well-deﬁned and systematically tested for regulatory purposes.
However, they also shared the broad view that more needs to be done to
improve how smart IMDs are managed.
5.1 Risk evidence
On the issue of understandings of risk, the empirical evidence demonstrates
that risks were associated with each characteristic (materiality, geography
and modality). While many of the concerns were applicable to IMDs gener-
ally, some (e.g. accessibility under the modality phenomenon) were unique
to new and emerging smart IMDs, and all were accentuated by smart
IMDs. Risk concerns were driven in part by the invasiveness and novelty of
the smart IMD in question, the former of which raises many well-known
physiological risks and some less well understood psycho-social risks, and
the latter of which introduces uncertainty about both risks and beneﬁts.
R3-Clinician-1 noted the following:
Some [IMDs], like a biosensor for drug delivery, wouldn’t yet be considered
standard, so people might have more concerns around something they see as
experimental… I think more established technologies would be ﬁne, [but]
others would need a little bit of work to get patient conﬁdence and longer
term safety data… [I]f you’re at the beginning of a technology then maybe
you need a bit of conﬁdence that it is going to be safe, but you don’t really
know until 10, 15, 20 years have gone by.
R6-Clinician-2, R9-Policymaker, and R10-Government Researcher agreed,
with the latter adding:
72Fu (n 72); L Olsen et al (eds), The Learning Healthcare System: Workshop Summary (National Academic
Press, 2007).
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Some of [the risk] has to do with how experienced and effective clinicians
become. So, whilst you would say [for a] pacemaker decades ago, ‘Oh, that’s
very risky’, I wouldn’t see that as risky now. I see anything to do with the
brain as being risky.
Ultimately, then, risk has a close relationship with novelty, and it is important
to develop a reliable evidence-base so as to erode the uncertainty. It was
agreed that better evidence of how new smart IMDs perform and how well
they serve patients is needed. Developing this evidence-base, as noted by
R1-Lawyer-1, is challenging, requiring cooperation and information
exchange. When the implantation and/or operation of the device is invasive,
the utility of information-sharing is increased. The same is true when the
device contains features that might seem inherently risky, such as transmitting
features.
5.2 Regulation evidence
Our respondents considered the regulatory framework to be wanting in
relation to all three phenomena relevant to our risk components of ‘safety’
and ‘efﬁcacy’. It was acknowledged that safety is addressed by the existing fra-
mework, but not sufﬁciently, and that efﬁcacy is almost completely ignored by
the regulation. In getting market approval, manufacturers need not demon-
strate efﬁcacy; the device must perform as intended by the manufacturer,73
and side effects must constitute ‘acceptable risks’.74 The need to demonstrate
performance imposes a responsibility on manufacturers to demonstrate that
the device operates as described, nothing more. The result has been that
useless and dangerous devices could and almost certainly do receive market
approval,75 which is particularly risky when one considers smart IMDs. A
true efﬁcacy requirement would demand evidence that the device actually
delivers a beneﬁcial clinical outcome (i.e. that it performs a valued and mea-
surable function that offers a recognised beneﬁt, and, where an existing device
is in use, the new one delivers improved effectiveness). No such regulatory cri-
terion is imposed.76 It has been observed that safety data is ‘hardly accessible
to outsiders like patients’,77 and without information on how devices are func-
tioning, clinicians have little basis on which to make treatment decisions, and
73EU Directive, Annex 1, paras 2, 9.
74EU Directive, Annex 1, para 5.
75In this regard, note that researchers established a ﬁctitious company peddling a hip with toxic potential
and similarity to three controversial implants, two of which had been recalled, and had their imaginary
device approved: Deborah Cohen, ‘How a Fake Hip Showed Up Failings in European Device Regulation’
(2012) 345 British Medical Journal 1.
76The new regime would introduce more granular information with respect to device performance, spe-
cifying manufacturer responsibilities with respect to pre-market clinical evaluations and post-market
clinical follow-up, including use of a common portal for reporting ‘serious incidents’: European Commis-
sion COM (2012) 542 ﬁnal (n 24), pp. 9–10.
77Altenstetter (n 53) 234.
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patients have little information on which to base consent. The shortfalls in
enforced processes to capture evidence has the consequence that decision-
making might be questioned from a rationality perspective.78
Despite the prevailing ‘bottom-up’ and ‘responsive-mode’ approach of
the EU being commended for delivering devices to the market quicker
than a more top-down command-and-control system might,79 it has
been heavily criticised for its complexity and lack of transparency,80 and
that criticism was echoed by our respondents, who considered the frame-
work lacking when measured against governance concepts viewed as
important in the emerging technologies setting; in particular that of ‘trans-
parency’. Mechanisms ensuring openness, information access (appropriate
information to appropriate stakeholders) and clear lines of responsibility
and liability should be deﬁning features of the regulatory regime if safety
and efﬁcacy are to be achieved. At present, it was felt, they are not. In par-
ticular, the relationship between industry/innovators and regulators/moni-
tors was felt by some respondents to be non-optimal, with serious barriers
to assessing the level or extent of risks posed by devices, even recalled
devices.81
6. Conclusion
Given the general acceptance that interventions on humans should be in the
individual’s best interests, and should be evaluated continually for their
safety, effectiveness, efﬁciency, accessibility and quality,82 one can conclude
that the regulatory framework around smart IMDs is insufﬁcient, with some
glaring imbalances and gaps,83 and this was the general position of our
78Annetine Gelijns, ‘Evidence, Politics and Technological Change’ (2005) 24 Health Affairs 29. Under the
proposed regime, there would be obligations to make safety information available to the public,
joint assessments of notiﬁed bodies by national authorities and Commission representatives and notiﬁed
body powers (and responsibilities) to inspect manufacturing sites, conduct tests on devices and shift
personnel so as to balance expertise with the danger of capture: European Commission COM (2012)
542 ﬁnal (n 24), pp. 7–8.
79PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Medical Technology Innovation Scorecard (2011) http://pwchealth.com/cgi-
local/hregister.cgi?link=reg/innovation-scorecard.pdf.
80Cohen and Billingsley (n 46); Altenstetter (n 53); R Dehousse, ‘Towards a Regulation of Transnational
Governance? Citizen’s Rights and the Reform of Comitology Procedures’ in Christian Joerges and E
Voss (eds), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics (Hart, 1999), 109–128.
81For an attempt to do so, see Matthew Thompson et al, ‘Medical Device Recalls and Transparency in the
UK’ (2011) 342 British Medical Journal 1. The new regime addresses this issue to some extent through
efforts to rebalance the power between manufacturers and importers on the one hand, and notiﬁed
bodies on the other, but it remains questionable whether the fragmented structures (with oversight
shared between the deeply ﬂawed notiﬁed bodies, the under-resourced national competent authorities
and Commission technocrats) can achieve the levels of safety expected, particularly given the pace of
innovation and the complexity of new devices.
82See Article 6, Declaration of Helsinki – Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects
(2002), as amended, and many more statements to a similar effect.
83And this has been recognised by European authorities who have initiated reform activities.
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respondents. With respect to imbalances, a holistic view suggests that ‘econ-
omics’ and ‘safety’, as opposed to ‘safety’ and ‘efﬁcacy’, sit at the heart of the
regime. The language of patient safety suffuses the instruments, which stipu-
late that IMDs must not compromise the clinical condition or safety of
patients, or pose a risk to others, including those who implant them, and
must comply with safety principles and the generally acknowledged state
of the art.84 However, the more prominent ambitions appear to be market
access and expansion.85 There is a clear push for early market availability
of devices, as evidenced by the regulatory emphasis on manufacture, distri-
bution, nomenclature and identiﬁers.86 The innovation-centric stance is
underlined by the regime’s very early and prominent statement that
members shall not create obstacles to devices entering the market or
being made available to clinicians.87 Indeed, both EU and US regulators
have been criticised for being ‘captured’ by industry, which is very much
focused on markets and proﬁt, and for allowing its safety assessments to
be driven by politics and market ideology.88
With respect to gaps, the regulatory framework exhibits some critical
lacunae, most particularly around generating evidence (pre and post-
market) about both safety and efﬁcacy. Given the proliferation, complexity
and power of smart IMDs, and so the magnitude of their potential impact
(both when operating properly and when malfunctioning), there is a pressing
need to better address safety, and to more explicitly address efﬁcacy. Concerns
over unsafe materials which have already been used in non-smart IMDs
underline the urgency for action on this front; IMDs are too often approved
for use without sufﬁcient understanding of their implications for health out-
comes under the present regime, which permits devices to be marketed and
implanted with dismayingly little understanding of key technical issues.
And the lack of follow-on oversight offers unscrupulous manufacturers
ample opportunities to take shortcuts (and, as our evidence highlights,
84EU Directive, Annex 1, paras 1, 6, 8.
85Jessica Bylander, ‘Eucomed Q&A: Where do EU Regs get it Right? An Emphasis on Innovation’ (2011) 37
The Gray Sheet 1; D Kramer et al, ‘Regulation of Medical Devices in the United States and European
Union’ (2012) 366 New England Journal of Medicine 848, 850.
86Altenstetter (n 53); Lawton Burns, The Business of Healthcare Innovation (Cambridge University Press,
2005); M Cheng, An Overview of Medical Device Policy and Regulation, NHP Brief No 8 (World Bank,
2007); W Mattli and N Woods, The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press, 2009).
OECD, Patient Safety Data Systems in the OECD (OECD, 2007) 8, 11, 18, states that patient safety data
systems are not on the agenda of all members, and data is not well integrated into regulatory systems.
87EU Directive, art 4. And this is in keeping with EU jurisdictional origins in promotion of the common
market, which imperative colours all or much of its legislation.
88General Accounting Ofﬁce, Shortcomings in FDA’s Premarket Review, Postmarket Surveillance, and Inspec-
tions of Device Manufacturing Establishments, GAO-09370T (GAO, 2009); John Wilkinson, ‘Outsourcing
R&D and the Medtech Industry’ (2010) (Eucomed, 23 February 2010) www.eucomed.be/blog/43/144/
blog/2010/02/23/Outsourcing-R-amp-D-and-the-Medtech-industry.
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shortcuts in relation to materiality, geography or modality can lead to con-
siderable harm).89
The proposed amendments to the European framework are certainly a step
in the right direction, but they are not enough.90 A regulatory regime which
not only accommodates anticipated technological innovations and trajectories
(and which captures aesthetic devices and implants), but which also articu-
lates key guiding principles for both innovators and regulators, could proﬁt-
ably re-balance stakeholder positions. As IMDs become more complex, more
embedded and more interactive, this will be important. Ultimately, a more
robust and transparent regulatory framework, and one that takes grater
notice of the patient, is warranted.91
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competent authorities could exercise a greater supervisory role over notiﬁed bodies, ensuring sufﬁcient
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practices, and they must have powers to intervene in situations that are deemed contrary to the
spirit and standards of the regulatory instruments. (2) Notiﬁed bodies, in addition to having better train-
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